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NOTE
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE MISDEMEANOR
MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE
Because the penalty is so much greater than that for other
forms of homicide, much has been written and said about the
crime of murder. It is continually being examined in all its
facets. The crime of manslaughter, on the other hand, receives
comparatively little attention, and the doctrines related thereto
are likely to be accepted without question. When rules are per-
mitted to remain in the law without serious scrutiny from time
to time, they have a tendency to become tyrannical in their ap-
plication. Great injustice may be done as a result of a blind
following of precedent. Reasonableness, not age, should be the
criterion by which rules of law are accepted. With these thoughts
in mind, let us turn to an examination of the misdemeanor man-
slaughter doctrine.
Manslaughter, as generally conceived by the courts today,
may be divided into two main categories, (1) voluntary, with
which this note is not concerned, and (2) involuntary In-
voluntary manslaughter, the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice, express or inplied, and without intent to kill or
inflict the injury causing death,i may be subdivided as follows
(a) Negligent manslaughter, which is, to take a
composite view of the cases, the unintentional killing of
a human being arising from the commission of an act
dangerous either in itself or by reason of the reckless
manner of its commission, or by recklessly omitting to
do some duty required by law; and
(b) Misdemeanor manslaughter, an unintentional
homicide committed accidentally during the commission
of some unlawful act, not amounting to a felony.'
"Davis v State, 31 Ala. App. 508, 19 So. 2d 356 (1944), People
v Oberlin, 355 Ill. 317, 189 N.E. 333 (1934), Lloyd v. State, 206 Ind.
359, 189 N.E. 406 (1934), Dean v State, 128 Neb. 466, 259 N.W 175
(1935), Commonwealth v McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 142 Atl. 213
(1928).
2People v Crossan, 87 Cal. App. 5, 261 Pac. 531 (1928), People
v Buzan, 351 Il. 610, 184 N.E. 890 (1933), State v. Custer, 129 Kan.
381, 282 Pac. 1071 (1930), State v. Cape, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456
(1933), Kirk v Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E. 2d 409 (1948).
2Wiley v State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869 (1918), Nichols v.
State, 187 Ark. 999, 63 S.W 2d 655 (1933), People v Brown, 392 Ill.
519, 64 N.E. 2d 739 (1946), Brown v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 406,
293 S.W 975 (1927), State v Lee, 180 La. 494, 156 So. 801 (1934).
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It is with subdivision (b) above that this note is primarily
concerned.
An analysis of the historical development of the doctrine
will aid in an understanding of the problem. It has been said
4
that the first clear distinction between homicide committed dur-
ing the course of an unlawful act and that committed during the
course of a lawful act was made by Bracton near the middle of
the thirteenth century 5 At that time there was no division be-
tween murder and manslaughter. All felonious homicide was
punishable by death and the need for a distinction did not exist.
The primary result of Bracton's distinction was the felony
murder doctrine,6 which was repudiated for all practical pur-
poses in England by Regmna v Serv67 When a distinction came
to be made between murder and manslaughter, misdemeanors
came to be applied to manslaughter as felonies had been applied
to murder.
Writing about four hundred years after Bracton, Coke,
without making any clear distinction between murder and man-
slaughter, gave impetus to the doctrine of unlawful act when
lie defined homicide by misadventure as " when a man doth
an act, that is not unlawful, which without any evil intent
tendeth to a man's death. "s (italics writer's) Quoting Bracton,
he declared, "If the act be unlawful, it is murder." 9 When the
distiiction between felony and misdemeanor came to be a part of
the law, Coke's words came to be interpreted to mean "If the
act be a felony, it is murder, if it be a misdemeanor, it is man-
slaughter." At the time Hale wrote his History of the Pleas of
the Crown,1 0 the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine was firmly
entrenched in the law of England. Sir John Chichester's Casei"
is illustrative. Sir John and is servant were mock-duelling,
Sir John using his sword, covered by its scabbard, and the
servant using his bedstaff. By accident the scabbard slipped off
' Wilner, Unintentional Homicide -in the Commission of an Un-
lawful Act, 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 811 (1939), MORELAND, RATIONALE
OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 2.
1'2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE (Twiss ed. 1879) 277.
'Where homicide results from the commission of, or attempt to
commit a felony, the necessary malice will be inferred in law, and
it will be held murder.
116 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
'Co. INST. (6th ed. 1680) 56.
'Ibid.
"New edition, 1778 (1st ed. 1736).uAleyn 12, 82 Eng. Rep. 888 (1648)
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the sword and the servant was run through and killed. Because
thrusting at the servant was voluntary and an assault in law, and
therefore unlawful, the death, though unintended, was held to be
manslaughter.
It may readily be seen that the strict application of the rule
as understood at that time must, of necessity, have been attended
by harsh results. Such a rule could not long stand, its applica-
tion was bound to be modified. Credit has been given to Hale
12
for providing the first relief in the rigid application of the rule.
It was he who made the first distinction between unintentional
homicide arising from the commission of acts inala itn se and those
mala prohibita. He said that if the act which caused the death
was malum se, it was manslaughter, but if the act was merely
malum prohibitum, and death ensued therefrom, it was not
manslaughter but misadventure. 13 This distinction was helpful
in reducing the severity of the rule. However, it still does not
provide an accurate yardstick by which one may measure the act
from which death results in order to determine if manslaughter
has been committed. What does the term inalum in se compre-
heuid? Does it mean any act morally wrong in itself'? May the
act be something less than this9 Or must it be something more
than morally wrong m itself ? The English courts seem to have
adopted the latter view. East, writing in the early part of the
nineteenth century, said
"So if one be doing an unlawful act, though not m.
tending bodily harm to any person; as throwing a stone
at another's horse; if it hit a person and kill him, it is
manslaughter. Yet in such cases it seems that the guilt
would rather depend on one or another of these cir-
cumstances, either that the act might probably breed
danger, or that it was done with a mischievous zntent.""1
(Emphasis writer's)
In like manner, Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown, said
that if a person kills another by shooting of a gun or in other
ways " which is a dangerous sport, and has not the least
appearance of any good intent, or by doing any other such idle
action as cannot but endanger the bodily hurt (sic) of some one
or other, or such like rash sports, which cannot be used with-
I Wilner, supra note 4, at 827.
"HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROVN, (new edit. 1778)
475.
, EAST, PLEAS OF THE CRO.WN (1803), c. V, sec. 32, p. 257.
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out the manifest hazard of life, he is guilty of manslaughter. "'U
It would seem that the real test, as put forward by these writers,
is the element of danger involved in the act rather than the
unlawfulness of the act. If the term malum sn se is to be used
to describe an act which in itself is likely to breed danger of
bodily harm to others, it is a mere phrase of art. As such it
serves to confuse the law on the subject as is shown by the
pronouncements of the courts which have attempted to define
the phrase.iO It sets up no accurate criterion by which courts
may judge the acts in question in particular cases. It is sub-
mitted therefore, that having no practical value, the terms
,nalzm, z se and malum prohibitum have no place today in the
law of homicide.
Since the malum in se-malunt prohibitum test is valueless
as an aid in the solution of the misdemeanor-manslaughter
problem, an examination of the modern decisions applying the
unlawful act doctrine in connection with manslaughter would
seem appropriate at this point. The rule itself, at least as a
matter of statement, is a harsh one, and, as will be shown, the
courts, in many instances, have resorted to various subterfuges in
order to avoid that harshness.
In avoiding the application of the doctrine, the two main
arguments used are (1) that the homicide was not the natural
and probable resulti 7 of the unlawful act and (2) that the act
causing the death was not unlawful enough to bring it within the
doctrine"i (the malunm prohibituni test stated in a slightly dif-
' 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824) c. 11, sec. 9,
p. 86.
' "An offense malum in se is one which is naturally evil, as ad-
judged by sense of civilized community; but an act malum prohibi-
tum is wrong only because made so by statute." State v. Trent, 122
Ore. 444, 259 Pac. 893, 898 (1927) The Michigan court seems to
adopt the idea that to be malum in se, the act must have been an in-
herently dangerous common law felony. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich.
562, 199 N.W 373 (1924).
"7People v Mulcahy, 318 Ill. 332, 149 N.E. 266 (1925), Kimmel
v. State, 198 Ind. 444. 154 N.E. 16 (1926), Votre v. State, 192 Ind.
684, 138 N.E. 257 (1923) (sick girl's death not the probable result of
taking a drink offered by the defendant), People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich.
562, 199 N.W 373, (1924), Dixon v. State, 104 Miss. 410, 61 So. 423
(1913), People v. Gaydica, 122 Misc. Rep. (N.Y.) 31, 203 N.Y.S. 243
(1923), State v. Satterfield, 198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E. 155 (1930), Com-
monwealth v. Aurick, 138 Pa. Super. 180, 10 A. 2d 22 (1940), Estell
v. State, 51 N.J. Law (22 Vroom) 182, 17 Atl. 118 (1889).
' People v. Sica, 76 Cal. App. 648, 245 Pac. 461 (1926), Hayes
v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E, 523 (1912) (second count), Thiede
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ferent manner) Typical of the cases using the first argument
is Estell v State'9 where the defendant attempted to drive by a
tollgate without paying. The gatekeeper in attempting to catch
the team by the harness was thrown to the ground and suffered
injuries, from which he died two days later. The defendant was
convicted of manslaughter. In reversing his conviction, the court
said that the unlawfulness of the act did not render the de-
fendant liable for all the undesigned and improbable con-
sequences thereof.
Another example is the case of People v Mdcahy.2 0 In that
case a Chicago policeman had been convicted of manslaughter by
an application of the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine for ac-
cidentally killing a girl with whom he was eating. Known to
the officer, gambling was going on in the restaurant and he
unlawfully failed to stop it. Because of an alarm created by his
companion, entirely unrelated to the gambling, the officer un-
holstered his pistol which accidentally went off and killed the
deceased. The trial court permitted his conviction on the ground
that the homicide took place while the officer was in the com-
mission of an unlawful act, i.e., permitting gambling. In re-
versing the conviction, the Supreme Court of Illinois said, "To
convict one of manslaughter for killing a person while in the
commission of an unlawful act, the state must show more than a
mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act
and the death. It must also show that the unlawful act was
the proximate cause of the killing. 21
Two good examples of the cases holding that the act causing
the death was not unlawful enough to come within the mis-
demeanor-manslaughter doctrine (category (2) above), are
Thiede v State22 and State v Collingsworth.2 3 In the former
case, the conviction was reversed on the ground that the instruc-
tion, saying merely that if the defendant furnished liquors to
the deceased and the deceased drank and died therefrom, the
defendant was guilty of manslaughter, was erroneous because
it did not take into consideration the factor of recklessness on
v. State, 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W 570 (1921), State v. Reitze, 86 N.J.
Law, 407, 92 At. 576 (1914), State v. Collingsworth, 82 Ohio St. 154,
92 N.E. 22 (1910).
51 N.J. Law (22 Vroom) 182, 17 Atl. 118 (1889).
318 Ill. 332, 149 N.E. 266 (1925).
Id. at -, 149 N.E. 266, 267.
106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W 570 (1921).
S82 Ohio St. 154, 92 N.E. 22 (1910).
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the part of the defendant. The question of whether the de-
fendant knew or should have known that the liquor was danger-
ous and poisonous was for the jury It will readily be seen from
a reference to the definitions at the beginning of this note that
putting a conviction on that ground would make it a negligent
manslaughter rather than a misdemeanor manslaughter.
Again, in State v Collingsworth, supra, the defendant while
driving his horse and wagon rapidly, in violation of an ordinance
of the city of Columbus, struck and killed the deceased. The
court held that the violation of a municipal ordinance was not
such an unlawful act as was contemplated by the statute.
An outstanding example of a miscarriage of justice and the
extreme harshness of the unlawful act doctrine is Keller v
State.24 In that case, the defendant was charged with driving
an automobile while intoxicated and running over one G, caus-
ing his death. The evidence for the defendant tended to show
that he was driving carefully, that G was crossing in the middle
of the street, that G's appearance was unexpected and that the
accident could not have been avoided in the exercise of due care
by a completely sober person. A Tennessee statute made it
illegal to drive while intoxicated. In affirming the conviction,
the court said that causal connection was not important nor even
subject to investigation when the act, during the commission of
which death ensues, is malurn in se. Had all other circumstances
been the same, with the sole exception of the defendant's being
under the influence of liquor, he would have been acquitted.
And yet, his being under the influence of liquor had nothing
to do with the death.2 As long as the rule is given lip service
by the courts this type of result will reoccur.
There have been numerous cases where the unlawful act
doctrine has been quoted as the grounds for conviction when the
same results could more logically have been obtained on the
grounds of criminal negligence. 2 In most of these cases the act,
• 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W 803 (1928).
Cf. People v Harris, 214 Mich. 145, 182 N.W 673 (1921), State
v. Trent, 122 Ore. 144, 259 Pac. 893 (1927), State v Brown, 205 S.C.
514, 32 S.E. 2d 825 (1945).
'Johnston v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. 667 (1892) (snapping "un-
loaded" pistol), State v. Naylor, 5 Boyce (Dela. Ct. Oyer & Ter.) 99,
90 Atl. 880 (1913) (shooting a pistol to scare trespasser), People v
Hubbard, 64 Cal. App. 12, 220 Pac. 315 (1923) (use of pistol to force
trespasser out of house, but reversed on other grounds), State v
Donovan, 8 A 2d (Dela. Ct. Oyer & Ter.) 876 (1939) (defendant in-
tended to shoot past deceased, but hit him instead), Gray v State,
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while unlawful, was also dangerous in itself or in a number of
cases was unlawful because it was dangerous. A look at a few of
these cases will illustrate the point. In Johnston v State,2 7 the
defendant, thinking his pistol unloaded, snapped it at his child
and accidentally killed his wife. He was found guilty of man-
slaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, pointing a pistol.
Since it is so common a saying as to have become a proverb that
"most people are killed with unloaded guns," the defendant
here should have known that his actions were inherently danger-
ous. His conduct was of such a degree of negligence that it
could be called reckless. 28 Similarly, in People v. Hulbbard,
2 9 it
was shown that the defendant was using his pistol merely to bluff
the deceased into leaving the defendant's house, and in the
scuffle which ensued, the deceased was killed. While the case
was remanded for a new trial because of error in failing to give
an instruction, Hubbard could have been found guilty of a
negligent manslaughter, in that his conduct could be taken for
reckless since the trespasser might have been evicted without the
use of the firearm.
Another illustration of this type of decision was the case of
a girl who went for a ride with her boy friend, who, while they
were parked, took out a gun and threatened suicide. She told
him he did not have the nerve, took the gun away from him, and
aiming it past him (or so she thought), accidentally killed him.
She was tried and convicted on the unlawful-act theory The
12 Ga. App. 634, 77 S.E. 916 (1913) (firing a pistol), State v. Custer,
129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071 (1929) (conduct denounced by statute
passed for purpose of protecting life and safety), Commonwealth v.
Couch, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 638, 106. S.W 830 (1908) (firing a pistol),
Sparks v Commonwealth, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 111, 96 Am. Dec. 196
(1868) (discharge of pistol in street), Egbert v State, 113 Neb. 790,
205 N.W 252 (1925) (intentional pointing and umntentional firing
of a pistol), State v. McNab, 20 N.H. 160, (1849) (abortion), Black
v. State, 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (1921) (target-shooting into
well travelled alley), Porter, v. State, 50 Okla. Cr. 136, 297 Pac. 305
(1931) (drunken driving, proiiimate cause proved), State v Brown,
205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E. 2d 825 (1945) (auto accident, defendant on the
wrong side of the road), cf. State v. Roundtree, 181 N.C. 535, -, 106
S.E. 669, 671 (1921)
194 Ala. 34, 10 So. 667 (1892).
'Recklessness has been described as something "more than
want of reasonable care." MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE 47 (1944) To be reckless, conduct "must be such as to
manifest a heedless disregard for or indifference to the rights of
others." Neessen v. Armstrong, 213 Ia. 378, -, 239 N.W 56, 59
(1931)
64 Cal. App. 12, 220 Pac. 315 (1923)
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following excerpt from the instructions to the jury will show
clearly how the defendant m this case was convicted of a negli-
gent manslaughter on the unlawful act theory
"Quite apart from the statute which has been ex-
plained to you, the law generally, that is, what is called
the common law, endeavors to safeguard human life
against the reckless use of firearms, and the negligent
handling of a loaded firearm causing death to another
is manslaughter at the common law for discharging
a deadly weapon in circumstances incompatible with
human life is an unlawful act. "W
The automobile accident cases are prime examples of cases
where the unlawful-act manslaughter is substituted for the negli-
gent manslaughter. In State v Brown"I the defendant was con-
victed of manslaughter when the deceased was killed as a result
of the defendant's driving on the wrong side of the road. South
Carolina statute made it manslaughter when death resulted from
driving on the wrong side of the road. It is true that there was a
definite statute on the subject here, but it would seem to be un-
necessary since such conduct, if reckless, would form the basis
for a conviction without the statute. And if there are circum-
stances present which would render the conduct not reckless
there should be no conviction in this type of case. Again in the
drunken-driving cases, the defendant is often convicted under a
statute making it a misdemeanor to drive while intoxicated. The
same conviction could be secured under the negligence theory
The defendant was convicted under just such a statute in Porter
v State.32 The result is correct in the majority of such cases,
since the average drunken driver is negligent. However if the
driver is acting without negligence, there should be no con-
viction.
33
Another misapplication of the misdemeanor-manslaughter
doctrine sometimes occurs in cases dealing with assaults. Where
the deceased has attacked the defendant with a dangerous weapon
after the defendant began the assault, and the defendant is forced
to kill the deceased to save his own life, it has been held that he
is guilty of manslaughter arising from the commission of an
- State v Donovan, 8A. 2d 876, 880 (Dela. Court Oyer & Ter.)
(1939).
205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E. 2d 825 (1945)
50 Okla. Cr. 136, 297 Pac. 305 (1931)
3 Contra: Keller v. State, supra note 24.
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unlawful act, i.e., the assault.34 The better view of this type of
ease, however, is that the death is voluntary manslaughter, being
an "imperfect self-defense." 35
In all the cases examined the overwhelming majority shows
that a conviction could have been obtained under the negligence
theory or the voluntary manslaughter theory as well as under the
unlawful-act theory It is submitted that in the few cases in
which this could not have been done an acquittal would have
been more proper.
It has been stated36 that negligence in doing acts which will
probably endanger life or limb may constitute such "gross and
culpable" negligence that it amounts to an "unlawful act" and
if such act is the proximate cause of death, manslaughter may re-
sult. This would seem to be going around the block to get next
door. If the negligence is culpable, manslaughter would be the
direct result without deciding that the negligence is unlawful
and that a death as a result of such act was manslaughter.
37
This court may have been influenced by Russell's work on crimes
where he said, "There are many acts so heedless and zncautious
as necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton, though there
may not be any express intent to do mischief, and the party com-
mitting them, and causing death by such misconduct, will be
guilty of manslaughter." '3 3 (italics writer's). The writer of
this note has no argument with the statement that the party "will
be guilty of manslaughter" but he does question the necessity of
turning negligence into an unlawful act in order to secure a con-
viction.
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the mis-
demeanor-manslaughter rule is too harsh in its statement, evaded
in its application, and should be superseded by the companion
concept of the negligent-manslaughter which comprises the great
majority of the cases under the misdemeanor-manslaughter
doctrine, and properly excludes those under that doctrine where
a conviction would be unjust. It is therefore concluded that the
unlawful-act doctrine should be stricken from the law in order to
IPeople v. Pursley, 302 Ill. 62, 134 N.E. 128 (1922), Roohana v.
State, 167 Wisc. 500, -, 167 N.W 741, 742 (1918)
'Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 443, 446 (1948), and cases cited therein.
'Kimmel v State, 198 Ind. 444, 154 N.E. 16 (1926).
" Supra, note 2.
"1 RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 636
(ed. 1853)
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reduce the chance of the miscarriage of justice which is possible
under the present rule. The following statute is proposed as a
model which will accomplish this purpose
Be it enacted that involuntary manslaughter is
that homicide committed, without a design to effect
death, by reason of conduct creating such an unreason-
able risk to human life and safety as to be recklessly
disregardful of such mterests.:
The statute proposed above is clothed in general terms
because it is felt that this definition of the negligent man-
slaughter is sufficiently broad to cover all homicides which
should reasonably be included in the involuntary manslaughter
category 41,
J. JERALD JOHNSTON
MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 128 (1944).
" It has been suggested that the statutory provision regarding
manslaughter arising from an abortion should be left on the statute
books because of the public policy which frowns on illegal abortions.
The basic question in this, as in any other case remains, however
Will it come within the negligent manslaughter theory' The writer
is of the opinion that such a homicide is comprised within the doc-
trine, since the fact that such an abortion is both dangerous and
unnecessary is sufficient to bring it within the definition of reckless
disregard of human life and safety.

